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CHAPTER





States impose initial eligibility requirements to define which work 
ers who lose jobs in covered employment may actually begin to draw 
regular unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. 1 These requirements 
serve two general purposes: (1) to insure that the worker has had suffi 
cient employment experience to qualify for UI benefits (so called 
"monetary" provisions), and (2) to test whether the worker is not 
responsible for his or her job loss ("nonmonetary" provisions). Implicit 
in these objectives is the philosophy that UI benefits are intended as 
wage loss insurance against the risk of involuntary unemployment. 
Other causes of unemployment are not compensated through the UI 
system in the United States, although they often are in other countries.
This discussion of eligibility provisions begins with a description of 
the general concerns that have motivated policy developments. Then a 
brief survey of existing state laws is provided. Because state provisions 
regarding initial eligibility are quite varied, the research on the effects 
of these differences is also surveyed. Finally, there is a brief outline of 
some of the remaining unanswered questions about initial eligibility 
provisions and a description of how further research might inform the 
development of UI policy.
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Some Conceptual Issues
Monetary eligibility provisions are employed by the states to ensure 
that workers have a sufficient employment history to qualify for UI 
benefit receipt. Frequently such provisions are justified as arising from 
the need to assure workers' "attachment to the labor force" (Haber and 
Murray 1966; U.S. Department of Labor 1994). Strictly speaking, 
however, existing monetary requirements do not do that: state require 
ments are not concerned with the UI recipient's current labor market 
status, but rather with his or her employment history. Of course, it may 
be true that, in many cases, employment history is a reasonably good 
predictor of current labor force status, especially in making the distinc 
tion between those workers who are unemployed and those who are not 
in the labor force. However, there are important circumstances where 
history is not a good proxy for current labor force status. For example, 
retirees may have significant employment histories but may have no 
intention of taking a new job, even if one is readily available. Alterna 
tively, new entrants to the labor force may be actively seeking work but 
have no employment history with which to establish an entitlement to 
benefits. The distinction between current labor force status and 
employment history has at times led to considerable controversy over 
UI regulations, such as those related to the treatment of pension 
income.2
A somewhat different rationale for monetary eligibility provisions 
derives from the notion of an "earned right" to UI benefits as insur 
ance. Under this conception, a worker's employment history creates an 
increasing right to benefits should a layoff occur. Provisions that tie UI 
entitlements to earnings history tend to reflect this insurance-like view 
of eligibility provisions. The fact that eligibility also depends on the 
conditions of the worker's separation from employment and on his or 
her continuing availability for work might be regarded as similar to 
other types of insurance provisions that seek to reduce the moral haz 
ard associated with insurance coverage.
Measuring employment history to assess monetary eligibility poses 
a variety of conceptual problems, and the states have taken a wide vari 
ety of approaches to this matter. Some of the major issues include the 
following: (1) the length of time over which the employment history is
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to be measured; (2) whether "employment" is to be measured by 
weeks, hours, earnings, or by some combination of these variables; (3) 
whether the specific time pattern of employment matters, or whether 
individuals with identical totals (such as total weeks worked, or total 
earnings during the "base" period) are to be treated identically; and (4) 
whether some types of employment (for example, seasonal or informal 
employment) are to be excluded from the history for purposes of eligi 
bility calculations. Decisions made about each of these issues will 
obviously affect the eligibility of specific types of workers for benefits. 
In addition, such seemingly inconsequential definitional questions may 
also build adverse incentives into the affected labor markets. For exam 
ple, there has been a long-standing concern that UI coverage of sea 
sonal employment may effectively provide a subsidy to such jobs 
(Murray 1972). More recently, concern about displaced workers has 
raised the issue of using relatively long labor market histories as a way 
of targeting benefits to those for whom unemployment entails a signifi 
cant loss of job-specific human capital. 3 Adoption of such special pro 
visions might reduce the risks associated with long-term employment, 
creating a variety of unpredictable labor market effects. Even decisions 
on more mundane matters, such as whether employment is to be mea 
sured by earnings or weeks, can create adverse incentive effects: an 
earnings-based criterion would favor short-term, highly paid jobs 
whereas a weeks-based criterion would favor part-time employment. 
Often states attempt to mitigate these effects by coupling their basic 
eligibility provisions with subsidiary requirements that seek to soften 
such incentives.
Nonmonetary provisions that relate to initial eligibility for UI are 
concerned solely with the claimant's job separation. Other nonmone- 
tary provisions that focus on continuing eligibility (such as the claim 
ant's continuing attachment to the labor force while collecting UI) are 
discussed separately in chapter 4. With regard to separation, the pri 
mary concerns of UI legislation have been to address the issue of 
"fault." The notion that UI benefits are intended for workers who lose 
their jobs through "no fault of their own" is deeply ingrained in the 
philosophy of the system,4 and virtually all policy interest has been in 
applying the concept of "no fault." Before examining such operational 
issues, it may be useful to ask why the determination of fault has been 
of such concern. After all, other forms of social insurance, such as
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workers' compensation or Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), pay only modest attention to the question. Part of the expla 
nation may lie in the nature of the moral hazard being addressed. With 
workers' compensation or AFDC, there may be less concern that cli 
ents become eligible through their own conscious actions (although the 
vast literature on disincentive effects associated with these programs 
suggests otherwise). In the case of UI, voluntary job separations are 
common, so it is possible that availability of UI may have a major 
impact on workers' choices.
A more important explanation for the focus by legislators on fault, 
however, may be that UI is financed through an experience-rated sys 
tem of employer taxes. Under such a system, many employers (that is, 
those' who are not at a state minimum or maximum tax rate and there 
fore are "effectively experience rated") have a direct interest is assur 
ing that they are not charged for benefit payments for which they are 
"not responsible." Only by so doing can they assure that their premium 
payments accurately reflect the labor market risks that their operations 
actually entail. Employers may therefore be quite active in pressing for 
the adoption of various fault provisions into UI statutes.
Determination of fault in the job separation process has tended to 
focus on three types of issues: (1) voluntary separations; (2) dis 
charges, especially for employee misconduct; and (3) involvement in 
labor disputes. Complex eligibility criteria have been developed for 
each of these topics, often with little coordination among the states. 
These varying provisions have probably had some differential impact 
on the types of job separations that actually occur.
Before reviewing the relatively slim amount of empirical literature 
on the possible size of the labor market impacts of differing UI provi 
sions, a summary of actual state laws that pertain to initial eligibility 
will be provided. Since this treatment must be brief, the interested 
reader is directed to the invaluable "Comparison of State Unemploy 
ment Insurance Laws," which is updated periodically by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 5
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State Requirements for Monetary Eligibility
All states utilize a one year "base period" for measuring employ 
ment history. 6 The definition of this period varies from state to state, 
however. In some cases the period consists of the 52-week period 
immediately prior to layoff, whereas in others there may be a substan 
tial lag between the end of the base period and the layoff date (or, more 
properly, the date at which the worker first files for benefits). All states 
require that an individual must have earned a specified amount of 
wages or must have worked for a specified number of weeks during the 
base period to qualify for benefits.
Recently, a few states have experimented with "alternative" base 
periods for workers who fail to meet their usual eligibility standards. 7 
The purpose of using such an alternative is to allow the states to focus 
on more recent earnings history so that workers with irregular employ 
ment patterns are more likely to be eligible. In his review of these pro 
visions, Vroman (1995a) finds that they do indeed increase eligibility 
for low-wage, part-time, and intermittent workers. Adoption of the pro 
visions tends to raise the number of UI recipients by 6-8 percent and to 
increase annual benefit payments by 4-6 percent.
The states have adopted a wide variety of formulas for defining 
monetary eligibility. 8 A brief summary of these requirements is pro 
vided in table 3.1. Four types of qualifying requirements are currently 
used: (1) multiple of high quarter wages (twenty-four states), (2) multi 
ple of weekly benefit amount (fourteen states), (3) a flat earnings 
requirement (six states), and (4) weeks or hours of work requirements 
(seven states). Many states also use alternative qualifying requirements 
for those workers who do not meet the primary requirements. A brief 
description of each of the primary requirements indicates how they 
operate in practice.
• Multiple of High-Quarter Wages. Workers are required to earn a 
certain dollar amount in the highest quarter of their base period. To 
qualify for benefits, they must then have total base-period earnings 
that are a multiple of this amount. Typically states require a multi 
ple of 1.5 times high-quarter earnings, that is, one-third of total 
base-period earnings must be outside the high quarter.
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SOURCE U S. Department of Labor (1994)
a 2Q means earnings required in two quarters in the base period Other figures refer to earnings
required outside the high quarter
b. HQ means high-quarter earnings.
c. Significant alternative qualification requirements in addition to that listed.
d wba means weekly benefit amount.
e X indicates that a state has such restrictions
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•Multiple of Weekly Benefit Amount. States first compute the 
weekly benefit amount for which the worker would be eligible— 
typically, a fraction (1/26 is common) of high-quarter earnings— 
and specify a multiple of this amount as the base-period earn 
ings required for eligibility. Because all states have minimum 
weekly benefit amounts, this minimum level determines the mini 
mum total earnings in the base period required for eligibility.
• Flat Amount. States require a certain dollar amount of total earn 
ings in the base period. Often, flat earnings requirements are also 
accompanied by quarterly distribution requirements that prevent 
qualification solely on the basis of a single short-term job.
• Weeks or Hours of Work. This requirement stipulates a minimum 
number of weeks (hours) of work at a specified minimum weekly 
(hourly) wage over the entire base period.
The operation of these formulas in practice is more complex than these 
summary descriptions imply. A state's detailed requirements are proba 
bly only fully understood by individuals actually involved in the 
claims-taking process. In its Summary of State Unemployment Insur 
ance Laws, however, the U.S. Department of Labor does compute a 
minimum base-period earnings requirement that permits some degree 
of cross-state comparison. These figures are shown in the second col 
umn of table 3.1. Overall, there is a considerable degree of variation in 
required base period earnings among the states. Requirements range 
from a low of $280 in base period earnings in Puerto Rico to a high of 
$5,400 in Montana. Some authors have made use of this variation to 
estimate the effects that different monetary eligibility requirements 
have on patterns of UI collection. Because of the complexity of the 
actual formulas, such estimates should be viewed with caution.
The third column in table 3.1 reports the minimum base-period 
earnings required for receipt of a state's maximum weekly benefit 
amount. Again, there is substantial variation in these figures, primarily 
because maximum weekly benefit amounts also differ significantly 
across the states (see chapter 5). As these figures show, obtaining a 
complete picture of the overall generosity of a state UI program neces 
sitates understanding the interaction between monetary eligibility 
requirements and methods of computing weekly benefit amounts.
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The final two columns of table 3.1 indicate a few of the special 
requirements that the states have implemented in order to bar certain 
types of employment from resulting in UI eligibility. Practically all of 
the states have distribution requirements that prevent eligibility based 
on employment in only a single quarter. The stringency of these provi 
sions varies in relatively complex ways among the states. Although 
most states do not make a distinction between seasonal and other 
employment in determining UI eligibility, fourteen have adopted spe 
cial provisions intended to restrict the eligibility of seasonal workers. 9 
These states have developed a variety of different ways of defining 
"seasonal employment." Some use an explicit designation of certain 
industries as being seasonal. For example, processing of perishable 
food is defined as seasonal in Delaware, tourism is defined as seasonal 
in Minnesota, and special eligibility requirements apply to cigar work 
ers in Florida. Other states have sought to establish a more universal 
definition of seasonality, often based on the length of regularly recur 
ring periods of employment and unemployment. In principle, wage 
credits earned by workers in seasonal industries can typically be used 
to establish UI eligibility only for unemployment experienced during 
periods in which these workers were usually employed in their sea 
sonal jobs. General UI eligibility requirements can only be met using 
wage credits earned in nonseasonal work. The degree to which such 
restrictions are enforced is uncertain.
State Nonmonetary Initial Eligibility Requirements
State UI laws incorporate a wide variety of nonmonetary require 
ments that affect initial eligibility. Most of these relate to the condi 
tions of the employee's separation from his or her employment. 
Describing variations in state practices is made difficult, not only by 
the large number of issues that are addressed in state laws, but also by 
varying administrative procedures that have a significant impact on 
how such statutes operate in practice. The first part of this section 
focuses on principal variations in the laws themselves. Later, adminis 
trative procedures that are used in the determination of nonmonetary 
eligibility are briefly discussed.
Table 3.2 summarizes state laws as they relate to three of the pri 
mary provisions affecting nonmonetary eligibility: (1) voluntary leav-
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D + 8 wba
D + 7 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
7-10
D + 10 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 6 wks
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wks
D + 8 wba
D + 6 wba
5-10
D + 8 wba
D + 7 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 8 wba
4-16
D + 8 wba
7-10
D + 15 wba
D + 5 wba
5
D + 5 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wks
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 10 wba
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D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 12 wba
Misconduct
Period0
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
6-12
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 5 wba
6
7+14 wba



































SOURCE. U S. Department of Labor (1994)
a X indicates that good cause is restricted to work-related causes or those attributable to employer
b Good cause specifically includes sexual harassment, compulsory reitrement, to accept other work, claimant's illiness, or to join armed forces (number
indicates the number of these specific inclusions in state law)
c. D means disqualification for duration of unemployment. Other penods are in weeks. Figure after + is earnings or employment required following end of
spell to reestablish eligibility, wba refers to multiples of weekly benefit amount
d. Additional restnctlons for gross misconduct: A means additional duration or requahfication restrictions; R means restrictions on wage credits from prior
employer
e S represents occurrence during work stoppage; P represents occurence while dispute is in active progress; 0 represents other.
f. Dispute excluded if employer fails to conform to contract (C), prevailing labor law (L), or engaged in a lockout (K)
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ing, (2) discharge for misconduct, and (3) involvement in a labor 
dispute. 10 All states permit workers who have voluntarily quit their jobs 
for "good cause" to collect benefits if they meet other eligibility provi 
sions. Definitions of good cause differ substantially among the states, 
however. Table 3.2 shows that most states restrict the "good cause" 
exemption to reasons for leaving that are directly related to the 
employment situation. 11 States that do not impose such a limitation 
sometimes permit the good cause exclusion to apply to "good personal 
reasons" as well. Several states also specify by statute certain reasons 
for voluntary leaving that are per se considered to be "good cause." 
These are quite varied, but a few of the specified reasons for leaving a 
job are common enough to be summarized in "Comparison of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws." Those specifically listed include the 
following: (1) sexual harassment, (2) compulsory retirement, (3) leav 
ing to accept other work, (4) illness, and (5) joining the armed forces. 12 
Table 3.2 reports the number of these specific exclusions contained in 
each state's laws. Of course, the precise definition that applies to each 
of these conditions also varies considerably across the states, and the 
specifics change frequently as a result of annual legislative initiatives 
and legal determinations (many of these changes are summarized 
annually in the Monthly Labor Review). Providing a simple overall 
summary of whether a state has a stringent or relatively lax voluntary 
leaving policy is, therefore, a difficult task.
Most states (forty-five in total) disqualify a worker who has volun 
tarily left his or her prior employment without good cause for the dura 
tion of the unemployment spell. In order to regain eligibility, 
individuals must then earn a minimum specified amount, usually 
phrased as a multiple of the weekly UI benefit. Once this subsequent 
earnings requirement is met, however, claims for benefits can be made 
based on base period earnings from the previous employment (i.e., the 
job that was voluntarily left), although often such benefits are not 
directly charged to the employer. 13 Eight states use a disqualification 
period of a fixed duration. These states also usually require some mini 
mum employment before reinstating the claimant's eligibility.
Disqualifications for discharges due to misconduct are in many 
ways similar to voluntary leaving disqualifications. State specifications 
of "good cause" restrictions are often framed in identical ways, and 
periods of disqualification are in many cases the same (see table 3.2).
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The primary unique aspects of misconduct provisions relate to states' 
willingness to specify degrees of misconduct together with accompa 
nying differential disqualifications. Ordinarily, discharge for inability 
to perform on the job is not considered misconduct. Even negligence in 
performing the job may not be sufficient cause for a misconduct dis 
qualification if the negligence was unintentional and had relatively 
minor consequences. Repeated negligence on the job or willful viola 
tion of company rules will result in a misconduct disqualification in 
most states, however. Many states also include additional penalties for 
especially "gross" misconduct, that is, misconduct involving illegal 
activity or serious safety violations. Table 3.2 indicates those states that 
either impose additional disqualifying restrictions for gross miscon 
duct (denoted by A in the table) or place restrictions on the wage cred 
its earned on a job from which the employee was discharged for such 
conduct (R).
All states have provisions in their UI laws that disqualify workers 
involved in a labor dispute. However, only a few states define "labor 
disputes" explicitly. A key issue is the distinction between strikes and 
lockouts. As table 3.2 shows, twenty-seven states exclude lockouts 
from disqualification, but that exclusion decision has proven to be quite 
controversial. It is often difficult to determine whether a particular 
work stoppage is a strike or a lockout, and employers may lawfully 
lock out workers when a union engages in "whipsaw strikes" (that is, 
strikes against a changing set of targets of the firms in an industry). 
Labor disputes that can be shown to have resulted from a firm's viola 
tion of labor law or from a firm's failure to conform to an existing con 
tract are also often excluded from disqualification (see table 3.2 for a 
summary).
Only one state, New York, specifies a fixed period of disqualification 
for participation in a labor dispute (7 weeks). Hence, in that state it is 
quite possible for strikers to collect UI benefits after a period of time. 
In fact, however, most strikes in New York are of relatively short dura 
tion, and few striking workers actually collect benefits. Indeed, Hutch- 
ens, Lipsky, and Stern (1989) argue that the New York law is relatively 
stringent because it does not require a "work stoppage" for UI disqual 
ification. In many other states (those denoted by an (S) in the table), 
labor dispute disqualifications come into play only when operations 
have been severely curtailed at the struck establishment. In these states,
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in situations in which operations at the struck firm continue at close to 
normal levels, there may be no disqualification, and strikers may col 
lect benefits.
Defining which workers are actually participating in a labor dispute 
has also proven to be controversial. States have tried to develop ways 
of identifying "innocent bystanders," so that their unemployment can 
be differentiated from that of active participants in the dispute. For 
example, workers who fail to cross a picket line are usually defined to 
be participants as are workers who help to finance a dispute other than 
by their regular union dues. On the other hand, workers who are tem 
porarily laid off at locations remote from a labor dispute (because of, 
for example, parts shortages) are usually eligible for benefits, espe 
cially if they can be shown not to be "directly interested" in the out 
come of the dispute.
The administrative procedures through which benefits may be 
denied for failing to meet nonmonetary eligibility criteria are complex 
and may affect which claimants actually receive benefits. Such proce 
dures can be categorized into four general stages as summarized here. 
(For a further discussion, see Chasanov and Cubanski 1995.)
• Fact Finding. Information is collected from both the claimant and 
the employer to determine the facts of the job separation.
• Adjudication. UI administrators examine the facts of a case and 
collect whatever additional information may be necessary to deter 
mine whether the separation meets the criteria specified in state 
laws.
• Determination. An initial decision regarding eligibility is reached 
by the UI staff. Most cases, for which there is no disagreement 
between the claimant and his or her employer, do not reach the 
stage in which a formal "determination" is made. Nationally, about 
20 percent of new and additional claims for regular state UI bene 
fits experience determinations, although this percentage does vary 
significantly among the states. Somewhat more than half of all sep 
aration determinations result in a denial of benefits.
•Appeal. Adverse determinations can be appealed by either the 
claimant or by the employer. Most lower authority appeal deci 
sions can also be further appealed to a higher level. In recent years 
rates of appeal of separation determinations have risen signifi-
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cantly, especially for issues involving misconduct. Currently more 
than 20 percent of misconduct determinations are appealed.
Implementing these procedures is relatively costly to the states. For 
example, Vroman (1995b) estimates that issues surrounding nonmone- 
tary determinations and appeals on separation issues account for about 
15 percent of total UI administrative costs. A detailed look at the pro 
cedures also shows that the states differ significantly in how they 
approach the various stages. Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) 
examine six representative states and find few commonalities. The pro 
cesses by which decisions are reached and the quality of information 
on which those decisions are based appear to be influenced both by 
general attitudes of state policy makers and by pressure to meet federal 
performance standards. State procedures and their resulting outcomes 
may also have been influenced by an increasing willingness of the par 
ties to challenge initial findings of UI eligibility. Most importantly, a 
number of observers have suggested that experience rating of firms 
prompts an increasing willingness to contest claims. As shown in the 
next section, however, the research evidence on this is ambiguous.
Ultimately, about 10 percent of all new and additional UI claims are 
denied over separation issues through the determination process. That 
figure says little about the total impact of nonmonetary eligibility pro 
visions, however, since the overall level of claims activity may also be 
affected by state laws and by the ways in which these laws are 
enforced. What limited information there is on such overall effects is 
summarized in the concluding part of the next section.
Research Findings
In comparison to the voluminous research on the job search effects 
of UI benefits and potential durations, there has been comparatively lit 
tle quantitative research on the effects of UI eligibility provisions. 
Given the complexity of the provisions and the variety of behavioral 
effects they may engender, this is not surprising. Still, this seems a very 
promising area for future research. Hence, the goals of this brief survey 
are to provide an overall indication of the direction that existing
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research has taken and to highlight some of the principal unanswered 
questions that remain.
Monetary Eligibility
Two different approaches have characterized research on the effects 
of monetary eligibility provisions. Econometric analysis has primarily 
used aggregate data to examine whether differing state eligibility pro 
visions have detectable effects on labor market outcomes. A common 
method has been to use simplified versions of state monetary eligibility 
laws, together with average wage data, to calculate the number of 
weeks the average worker would have to be employed in order to 
achieve eligibility. For example, Nicholson (1981) followed this proce 
dure in a study of state exhaustion rates. He found that each additional 
week of average earnings required for UI eligibility was associated 
with a reduction of between 1.1 and 2.3 percentage points in the state 
exhaustion rate (although the results were not always statistically sig 
nificant). A possible interpretation of this finding is that more stringent 
monetary eligibility provisions do indeed achieve the goal of eliminat 
ing from UI eligibility some of those workers with weak labor force 
attachments. Using a similar approach in examining reasons for declin 
ing UI claims during the 1980s, Corson and Nicholson (1988) found 
that more stringent monetary qualifying requirements had a signifi 
cantly negative effect on UI claims. They show that changes made by 
the states during the late 1970s increased the weeks employed required 
by UI eligibility by 0.2 weeks, on average. This greater stringency may 
have accounted for between 3 and 10 percent of the significant decline 
in UI claims during the 1980s. 14
Aggregate studies of the effects of monetary eligibility provisions 
have paid relatively little attention to the distribution requirements in 
state laws. 15 One hypothetical simulation of earnings patterns prepared 
by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) sug 
gests that these requirements can be quite important in determining 
which types of low-wage workers qualify for UI. In general, the 
requirements were found to be more likely to disqualify part-time, full- 
year workers than to disqualify full-time, part-year workers (although 
these workers may be affected by state seasonal restrictions). Hence, 
such requirements may significantly affect part-time workers' ability to
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qualify for UI, but there appears to be no quantitative estimate of the 
size of this effect.
The use of micro-level data to examine monetary eligibility require 
ments is severely limited by many states' failure to retain data on ineli 
gible claims. Several early studies that were used by states in 
developing their eligibility requirements are reviewed by Haber and 
Murray (1966, pp. 256-264). They conclude that few part-time workers 
could meet the then existing UI qualifying requirements. The authors 
go on to recommend that "a requirement of 20 weeks of substantial 
earnings is about right" (p. 264), but the criteria being used to make 
that judgment are not clearly stated. In any case, the 20 week standard 
has become embedded in a variety of UI policy initiatives. For exam 
ple, changes made to the extended benefits (EB) program in the early 
1980s instituted a 20 weeks of work requirement (or its equivalent for 
states with other types of qualifying requirements) for EB eligibility. 
The intention of the change was to adopt a more uniform requirement 
across the states and to focus EB eligibility on those workers with a 
significant employment history. A simulation study of the effect of this 
change (Corson and Nicholson 1985) found that its impact was rela 
tively minor—reducing national EB first payments by approximately 5 
percent. Emergency EB programs instituted since 1980 have contained 
similar uniform qualifying wage requirements that have also disquali 
fied relatively few recipients. 16 For more generous states, however, the 
impact was much larger. In Wisconsin, for example, the authors calcu 
lated that EB caseloads were reduced by over 24 percent relative to the 
then existing 15 week standard in that state. Although various sugges 
tions have been made about using more stringent base-period employ 
ment standards, together with longer base periods, for EB eligibility, 
none of these has been enacted into law.
Several recent studies have examined the effects of changing mone 
tary eligibility requirements for UI in Canada. Because the Canadian 
system is quite similar to that in the United States, findings from these 
studies may offer insights on experiences in this country. 17 Some of the 
most intriguing evidence is associated with the Canadian Variable 
Entrance Requirement (VER), which tailors monetary eligibility stan 
dards to provincial unemployment conditions. As a result of changes to 
the VER undertaken in 1990, Canada now requires between 10 and 20 
weeks of base-period employment as regional unemployment rates
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decline from 15 to 6 percent. The regional variation thereby imparted 
into monetary eligibility standards and the unusual circumstances sur 
rounding implementation of the new requirements have provided the 
source for a variety of empirical investigations. For example, Christo- 
fides and McKenna (1996) find that a significant number of jobs termi 
nate once they have reached the standards specified under the VER. 
These effects seem to have been the largest in those provinces where 
average job durations were the shortest. Similarly, Green and Riddell 
(1993a) examine a "natural experiment" in which, because of a delay 
in enacting the 1990 legislative changes, several regions had their eligi 
bility standards temporarily raised from 10 to 14 weeks. This change 
had a detectable effect on the labor markets of those regions. Specifi 
cally, employment durations lengthened a bit (primarily because lay 
offs were delayed), and the measured unemployment rate during this 
period fell by as much as 0.4 percentage points.
Overall, the Canadian results suggest that monetary eligibility rules 
may have their most important labor market impacts by changing the 
characteristics of some, relatively marginal, jobs. That is, the rules pro 
vide incentives for both employers and employees to adopt employ 
ment patterns that maximize UI entitlements. The size of such effects 
in the context of the total labor market in Canada is unknown, however. 
In the United States, experience rating of UI taxes may work to miti 
gate the size of such effects. Again, however, there appear to be no 
quantitative estimates of such impacts.
Of the specific employment exclusions contained in state monetary 
eligibility statutes, those related to seasonal employment have received 
the most attention. Studies have focused both on simple measurement 
of the number of seasonal workers who collect UI and on the potential 
labor market consequences arising from the subsidization of such 
employment. The important early survey by Murray (1972) provided 
the impetus for much of this research. In that survey Murray reviews 
many of the studies that the states used in developing their regulations 
with regard to seasonal industries. Those studies tended to find that 
repeat use of UI was centered in seasonal industries—especially con 
struction. Murray does not explicitly evaluate the allocational signifi 
cance of this finding. Rather, he adopts the position that such receipt of 
UI is appropriate so long as workers continue to meet availability for 
work requirements (see chapter 4) during their off-seasons.
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More recent concerns about the potential allocational effects of UI 
coverage of seasonal work have focused primarily on the impact of 
incomplete experience rating. Findings from large, nationwide data 
bases tend to confirm that more complete experience rating dampens 
seasonal fluctuations in labor demand, especially in construction and in 
durables manufacturing (Card and Levine 1994) and in retail trade 
(Anderson 1993). Generally, these studies do not take state seasonal 
exclusions explicitly into account, however, so that their implications 
for policy with respect to initial or continuing eligibility are not clear.
That eligibility provisions can have a major impact on a seasonal 
industry is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the Newfoundland 
fisheries. Extension of unemployment benefits (with relatively weak 
eligibility provisions) to the fisheries in 1957 had the effect of signifi 
cantly expanding that industry (Ferris and Plourde 1982). Indeed the 
Newfoundland Royal Commission on Employment and Unemploy 
ment concluded that UI eligibility had created "pressure...to qualify as 
many people as possible for UI" and that this had become "the main 
form of income security in Newfoundland" (cited in Green and Riddell 
1993a). Whether such dramatic results characterize isolated pockets in 
the more integrated labor markets of the United States is not known.
Nonmonetary Eligibility
Perhaps because of the complexities inherent in characterizing state 
nonmonetary eligibility provisions, research on the effects of such 
requirements is of modest proportions. A procedure followed by some 
researchers is to use nonmonetary disqualification rates as explanatory 
variables in regressions on outcomes such as UI claims. For example, 
Corson and Nicholson (1988) find that rising separation denial rates in 
the late 1970s may have accounted for between 2.4 and 24 percent of 
the decline in UI claims during the 1980s. 18 However, the use of denial 
rates in this way does not provide any direct means of inferring what 
the effects of changes in actual UI laws or administrative practices 
might be. Hence, the policy conclusions that might be drawn from such 
correlations are frequently ambiguous.
The most extensive study of the relationship between actual state 
practices and observed denial rates is by Corson, Hershey, and Ker- 
achsky (1986). These authors use a pooled cross section, time series
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analysis for 51 UI jurisdictions over the period from 1964 to 1981. 
Although they do find a few statistically significant relationships, over 
all they encounter difficulties in differentiating between the explicit 
exclusionary effects of more stringent separation regulations (which, 
ceteris paribus, should increase denial rates) and the behavioral effects 
of such regulations on workers' willingness to claim UI benefits in the 
first place. For example, they find that states that deny benefits for the 
duration of the unemployment spell for voluntary leaving have lower 
denial rates than those with less stringent regulations, possibly because 
these provisions deter claims. On the other hand, they find that states 
that restrict good cause exemptions to employment related situations (a 
more stringent regulation) have higher denial rates. Hence, the authors' 
statistical analyses (and their detailed case studies of individual states) 
suggest caution in interpreting the meaning of observed UI denial rates 
and their possible correlations with other UI outcomes.
Similar ambiguities in the interpretation of data on administrative 
actions in the UI system characterize the recent paper by Vroman 
(1995b). In this paper, the author identifies two major trends in the 
aggregate data. First, although nonmonetary determinations have 
declined somewhat from their peak levels in the 1970s, appeals volume 
increased throughout the 1965-1993 period. Within these general 
trends, both determinations and appeals connected with employee mis 
conduct have grown in relative importance, whereas actions involving 
voluntary quits have diminished. However, major differences among 
the states continue to exist in all of these measures, and reasons for 
such differences remain largely unexplained.
In the final sections of his paper, Vroman uses pooled data from fifty 
UI jurisdictions over the 1988-1993 period to examine UI appeals, 
especially those that are employer-initiated. His general goal is to 
determine whether possible increasing employer activism in contesting 
claims (sometimes with the use of UI service bureaus) 19 has had any 
measurable effect. Ultimately, however, the author is not able to mea 
sure such impacts accurately because of the overall complexity of the 
UI administrative structure and because his only measure of employer 
incentives, the Experience Rating Index (ERI20), has many shortcom 
ings. Still, by providing a thorough and careful examination of this 
underused data set, Vroman sets forth a useful basis for future research 
into UI administration of nonmonetary eligibility determination.
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With regard to the treatment of labor disputes, Hutchens, Lipsky, 
and Stern (1989) provide a detailed statistical analysis of the effect of 
state disqualification provisions on strike activity. As in other studies, 
they utilize a pooled cross section, time series analysis over the period 
from 1960 to 1974 and demonstrate that UI provisions have a clearly 
detectable effect on strike frequency (although no unambiguous impact 
on strike durations). Specifically, they find greater strike frequencies 
tending to occur in states that permit strikers to receive benefits if oper 
ations of their employers continue or in states that permit benefits to 
innocent bystanders; these results are especially found in states with 
generous UI programs.
Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stern also provide a detailed analysis of the 
1981 strike by air traffic controllers, illustrating some of the complex 
ways in which the labor dispute provisions in UI laws interact with 
laws regulating misconduct disqualifications. Because the strike was 
technically illegal, most states took the position that their provisions 
regarding misconduct took precedence over labor dispute issues. In 
these cases, most controllers could collect UI only after a disqualifica 
tion period. A few states (most notably Michigan) took the position 
that the strike was not sufficient in itself to warrant a misconduct dis 
qualification and that normal labor dispute provisions in state law 
should take precedence. In these cases, the controllers were usually 
awarded benefits. This wide variety of outcomes, experienced by work 
ers who were all in essentially the same position, highlights the 
increased fairness that might be achieved by moving toward more uni 
form nonmonetary eligibility provisions on a national basis.
Conclusion
This review of state provisions for initial eligibility for UI suggests 
four broad areas in which future research might aid in the formulation 
of policy.
• the usefulness of variable monetary eligibility requirements
• how monetary eligibility provisions affect the ability of workers in 
"nonstandard" employment situations to collect benefits
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• relationships between seasonal exclusions and incomplete experi 
ence rating
• the desirability of moving toward more uniform nonmonetary eli 
gibility requirements
Variable Eligibility Requirements
The minimum earnings required for UI eligibility are relatively 
modest in most states. 21 Although greater earnings are often stipulated 
if the worker is to qualify for maximum benefits or durations, these 
extra requirements are also quite modest in many cases. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, little is known about the effects of these require 
ments or about their ability to target UI benefits to recipients in the 
most efficient ways. Policy makers have similarly made few attempts 
to explore the utility of tailoring monetary eligibility standards to meet 
specific policy goals. Two such adaptations are used frequently in other 
countries and might be more seriously considered for the United 
States: (1) varying eligibility standards in response to labor market 
conditions, and (2) tying the potential duration of benefits more closely 
to work history.
Basing eligibility standards on labor market conditions might 
achieve two goals. It would make the UI system even more responsive 
to the business cycle by increasing payments to those recession victims 
who have been laid off after only a short time on the job. This 
increased sensitivity might improve the economic stabilization proper 
ties of the regular UI system and (perhaps) mitigate some of the need 
for the adoption of emergency extensions during recessions. Reducing 
eligibility standards during periods of declining labor demand would 
also provide increased protection to newly hired workers when they 
most need it. This would, therefore, represent a way of providing 
greater insurance protection during periods of higher layoff risk in 
much the same way that extending UI potential durations provides 
increased protection against the lengthening unemployment spells 
experienced during recessions. Similarly, because of the strong pro- 
cyclical behavior of quits, such a policy change might mitigate the 
need to monitor and adjudicate voluntary leaving issues.
There are several ways in which state UI systems could tighten the 
connection between potential durations and work history. Most obvi-
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ously, states could adopt increasingly stringent base-period employ 
ment requirements if workers are to be eligible for maximum potential 
durations. This would further strengthen the notion of an "earned 
right" to more generous UI benefits. To the extent that prior employ 
ment tenure is correlated with workers' losses of job-specific human 
capital, such an approach would also be consistent with providing 
greater benefits to those who have suffered the greatest losses.
Any explicit use of employment history to target special re-employ 
ment assistance to displaced workers would probably require the use of 
a longer base period, however. That purpose is already served to some 
extent in the Trade Adjustment Assistance program by requiring certifi 
cation of trade impact. Currently, such certification enables workers 
who can demonstrate that imports contributed to their unemployment 
to receive an additional 26 weeks of UI benefits following exhaustion, 
providing they agree to enter an appropriate training program. This has 
the effect of focusing benefits on workers with significant employment 
histories (Corson et al. 1993). Devising administrative methods for col 
lecting longer base period employment information might provide a 
similar way of focusing longer UI potential durations on more general 
categories of displaced workers, especially those suffering major eco 
nomic hardships. 22 Administrative costs associated with moving to 
longer base periods in the context of current UI data systems could be 
quite high, however.
Monetary Eligibility and Nonstandard Employment
Existing provisions for monetary eligibility are implicitly based on a 
"standard" model of employment in which a single employer certifies 
that the worker has had sufficient employment during the base period 
specified in state law. The employer usually must also certify that the 
worker meets nonmonetary eligibility provisions—most importantly, 
that he or she has been involuntarily laid off. As employment situations 
become increasingly diverse, this model may no longer be appropriate 
in many circumstances, including (1) regular, part-time employment; 
(2) temporary employment; and (3) self-employment or independent 
contractor status.
Current monetary eligibility standards tend to discriminate against 
those whose employment is part-time, especially for low-wage workers
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(Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1995). This 
approach may possibly have been acceptable in earlier times, when 
part-time work tended to be associated with weak labor market attach 
ment. However, the rapid growth in flexible working arrangements has 
made such an assumption increasingly untenable. Deciding whether it 
is desirable to expand UI coverage to workers whose employment is 
primarily part-time involves a number of important trade-offs.
Although much early research tended to treat growth in part-time 
work arrangements as a labor supply phenomenon, more recent 
research focuses on the demand side of the market. Assuming that part- 
time and full-time workers are nearly perfect substitutes, an increasing 
use of part-time workers may be explained by a decline in their relative 
costs—especially because the hiring of such workers may involve 
lower levels of "quasi-fixed" costs (Oi 1962; Ehrenberg and Smith 
1991). Whether the exclusion of low-wage, part-time workers from UI 
eligibility has contributed to this trend is not known. Given prevailing 
levels of UI taxation, such an effect does not seem implausible, how 
ever. Hence, relaxation of monetary eligibility requirements to increase 
the eligibility of part-time workers (this would primarily necessitate 
the relaxation of the requirements that most earnings occur in the high 
quarter) could have the effect of slowing the growth in such arrange 
ments.
Reducing restrictions on part-time workers' access to UI might also 
pose administrative difficulties in assessing both initial and continuing 
eligibility. Certainly existing voluntary leaving statutes would have to 
be modified to develop clear standards about when a separation had 
actually occurred. In addition, continuing eligibility provisions would 
have to be adapted to meet the circumstances of individuals looking for 
part-time work. Making such changes does not seem to pose insur 
mountable problems, however, if the goal of providing increased pro 
tection to part-time workers were judged to be an important expansion 
of the safety net that UI provides.
The challenge in providing adequate UI coverage to workers in tem 
porary employment centers on how job separations are to be defined. 
In this regard, the situation is similar to seasonal employment in that 
workers maintain some attachment to their jobs. In the seasonal case, it 
appears likely that UI coverage of gaps in employment will provide a 
clear subsidy to temporary jobs. From workers' perspectives, however,
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there may be somewhat more certainty associated with return to work 
at a seasonal job than with the assurance that a new temporary job will 
materialize. Hence, availability for work may be more difficult to 
appraise. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that regular, temporary 
employment may be on the increase, there is currently little data with 
which to estimate its relative importance or simulate possible effects of 
alternative UI eligibility criteria. For workers associated with tempo 
rary employment agencies or who work on a temporary basis for a sin 
gle employer, it may be possible to devise eligibility standards based 
on past patterns of regular employment, but no state has as yet made 
any major moves in that direction.
As described in chapter 2, the most significant issue involving UI 
eligibility for ostensibly self-employed workers involves the potential 
misclassification of employees as independent contractors. Because 
firms can significantly reduce their liabilities for both taxes and fringe 
benefits through such a classification, it seems likely that it has been 
adopted for many workers in types of situations that meet IRS stan 
dards for "employment." Whether UI coverage is extended to such 
workers depends on future initiatives by the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser 
vice.
For workers whose jobs are truly of a self-employed character, 
extension of UI coverage poses a number of thorny issues. Again, most 
of these focus on matters of nonmonetary qualification. Because the 
adversarial conflict between employer and employee cannot be relied 
upon in this situation to provide unbiased information about the nature 
of the job separation, some other mechanism must be found. California 
has experimented with interview-oriented procedures, but their imple 
mentation remains controversial—especially with regard to how the 
self-employed should have UI tax liabilities assessed.
Seasonal Exclusions
The statistical research reviewed in the previous section confirms 
that availability of unemployment benefits may significantly increase 
the seasonal sensitivity of employment, especially in the presence of 
incomplete experience rating. The majority of this research has paid 
relatively little attention either to the explicit seasonal exclusions in 
state laws or to the probably more important implicit seasonal exclu-
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sions created by the distribution criteria in state monetary eligibility 
standards. Hence, we have a very incomplete picture of how unem 
ployment compensation and seasonal employment are related. A more 
comprehensive examination would require both an appraisal of how UI 
availability affects the level of employment in seasonal industries and 
how such availability affects seasonal wage premia. In the absence of a 
relatively full modeling of the total labor market impact of UI, it is dif 
ficult to determine whether the correct policy response to potential sub 
sidies to seasonal industries is the adoption of more complete 
experience rating or appropriate modifications to explicit and implicit 
seasonal exclusions by states.
Uniformity in Nonmonetary Eligibility Requirements
The significant interstate variation in nonmonetary eligibility 
requirements surveyed earlier in this chapter raises the issue of whether 
potential gains in simplicity, efficiency, and fairness might be achieved 
by moving toward more uniform national standards. Some very prelim 
inary moves in that direction have been made with regard to continuing 
eligibility conditions that apply to extended benefits (see Corson and 
Nicholson 1985). Very little has been done about regular UI, perhaps 
because of constitutional difficulties in implementing national stan 
dards, but existing differences may pose inequities for claimants who 
can find identical circumstances treated very differently (as illustrated 
by the air traffic controller case). More generally, differences in state 
nonmonetary eligibility provisions may have allocative significance 
both in terms of how local labor markets operate (the evidence from 
Green and Riddell (1993a), on local Canadian labor markets is quite 
convincing on this point) and in terms of the overall location of eco 
nomic activity among the states. For example, it would be surprising if 
the significant effects of UI on strike activity found by Hutchens, 
Lipsky, and Stern (1989) had no impact on the willingness of some 
firms to locate in a state. Given the difficulties in characterizing state 
laws and procedures, however, relatively little is currently known about 
the likely size of such effects.
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NOTES
I would like to thank Patncia Anderson, Walter Corson, Alec Levenson, Karen Needels, Chris 
O'Leary, and especially Craig Riddell, who offered a number of suggestions about ways in which 
this chapter could be improved. Participants in the conference "Unemployment Insurance in the 
United States," sponsored by the W. E. Upjohn Institute and the U S. Department of Labor, also 
offered many thoughtful insights on this topic.
1 Eligibility requirements for the regular UI program also apply to programs for military per 
sonnel (UCX) and for federal employees (UCFE). They are also relevant to programs that require 
regular UI collection prior to participation, including regular extended benefits (EB), emergency 
extended benefits (FSB, FSC, and EUC), and trade adjustment assistance (TAA) benefits.
2 For a discussion of the evolution of pension offset legislation in UI laws, see chapter 12.
3 No state currently uses more than one year of labor market history in determining UI eligi 
bility, although such provisions are relatively common in other countries (Congressional Research 
Service 1992)
4 The history of the notion of "fault" as it relates to job separations in both private and public 
UI systems is discussed in Blaustem (1993)
5 An annual summary of changes in state laws also appears in the Monthly Labor Review
6 In some cases, mainly involving disabilities, the base period may be extended.
7 The six states that include an alternative base period in their eligibility provisions are 
Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington
8 Throughout this discussion, the fifty-three primary UI jurisdictions (fifty states, the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) will be referred to as "states."
9 Other special exclusions in UI initial eligibility laws include students hired by their educa 
tional institutions, school employees during the summer months, and professional athletes during 
the off-season Most states also disqualify self-employed earnings from conferring UI eligibility, 
although a few (for example, California) have experimented with limited inclusions of such earn 
ings.
10 Other disqualification provisions relate to fraudulent misrepresentation and to the receipt 
of certain kinds of income, such as severance pay, workers' compensation, and pensions. These 
provisions will not be explicitly examined here
11 Although "good cause" is defined in relationship to the employment situation, there is usu 
ally no necessary finding of employer "fault." In some states, good cause also includes situations 
where family obligations lead the employee to leave his or her job. These obligations can include 
leaving to marry, leaving to move with a spouse, and leaving to perform domestic obligations. In 
many cases, these inclusions relate only to initial eligibility, and standard provisions for continu 
ing eligibility still apply The situation of workers who leave employment because of pregnancy is 
quite complex, involving issues both of initial and continuing eligibility For a discussion see 
Brown (1995).
12. These exemptions must also be understood in the context of the continuing eligibility pro 
visions of states For example, a worker who leaves to accept other employment would be eligible 
only if that new job did not work out and he or she is then found to be able and available for work.
13. A few states also reduce UI entitlements either by an amount equal to the number of weeks 
of disqualification or by a fixed percentage
14 A simple regression using cross section data for 1993 suggests that similar results hold 
across the states In this regression, each additional week of employment required for UI eligibil 
ity was estimated to be associated with a reduction of approximately 2 percent in the ratio of 
insured to total unemployment
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15. The Nicholson (1981) study of exhaustion rates does report that states with no distribu 
tional requirements in their monetary eligibility provisions have significantly lower exhaustion 
rates. A possible explanation is that such states make it easier for seasonal workers to qualify for 
benefits, and that those workers typically do not exhaust their UI entitlements
16. For example, Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986) find that approximately 4 percent 
of regular UI recipients were made ineligible for the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) 
program by the adoption of such requirements
17. Monetary eligibility in Canada is based on weeks of employment. A "week of employ 
ment" is defined as any week in which the individual works at least 15 hours for pay or in which 
he or she earns 20 percent of the maximum insured earnings Voluntary quits also incur disqualifi 
cations in Canada. Unlike the United States, however, in some cases new entrants and reentrants 
are eligible for UI in Canada. Also, in Canada, UI taxes are not experience rated For a summary 
of various issues related to the Canadian system, see Green et al. (1994) and Green and Riddell 
(1993b)
18 The wide range in estimated effects stems primarily from complications in interpreting the 
impacts of falling voluntary separation denial rates during this period The authors see this trend 
as arising from increasingly clear and stringent voluntary leaving provisions being adopted by the 
states, although they admit to some ambiguity on the point. A simple cross section regression 
using recent data from the states shows a negative correlation between misconduct denial rates 
and UI claims, but no significant effect for voluntary leaving denials.
19 These service bureaus contract with firms to handle their Ul-related activities Frequently, 
such services are also provided by accounting companies that handle firms' other payroll needs as 
well Because providers of such services may encounter substantial economies of scale in 
addressing technical issues related to UI eligibility, it is possible that they may have been effective 
in contesting claims in order to reduce their clients' UI tax liabilities. Although employers' use of 
these services has expanded rapidly in recent years (and utilization rates are concentrated geo 
graphically), there are no quantitative estimates of their overall impact on the UI claims process.
20. The ERI is defined as the ratio of fully charged UI benefits to total UI benefits paid. This 
measure varies both from state to state and over the business cycle for a variety of reasons, many 
of which are unrelated to the effective degree of experience rating for the typical firm.
21. Generalizing from the wide variety of state requirements is difficult: it does appear that 
most state minima fall well short of requirements in other countries, although many other coun 
tries also offer unemployment assistance to those with little or no employment history. For a sum 
mary, see Congressional Research Services (1990)
22 For an analysis, see Congressional Budget Office (1990).
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